Scientific Definition
Optimizing for queue length over diagnosis depth turns clinicians into ticket-closers.
Plain-English Definition
Optimizing for queue length over diagnosis depth turns clinicians into ticket-closers.
Feynman Explanation
We shortened the wait. We also shortened the medicine.
Core Principle
Optimizing for queue length over diagnosis depth turns clinicians into ticket-closers.
Mechanisms
Pending editorial review.
Optimizing for queue length over diagnosis depth turns clinicians into ticket-closers.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Single-metric accountability invites systematic gaming.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Inputs (Triggers)
Pending editorial review.
Outputs (Behaviors)
Pending editorial review.
Behavioral Signature
We shortened the wait. We also shortened the medicine.
Examples
- VA wait-time scandals tied to falsified scheduling.
- Single-metric accountability invites systematic gaming.
Pending editorial review.
Famous Experiments
Pending editorial review.
Design Principles
- Multi-dimensional outcome panels. Independent audit.
Measurement Approaches
Pending editorial review.
Evidence
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
The Perverse Incentive Lens™
How this behavior is exploited — and how to redesign around it.
- Multi-dimensional outcome panels. Independent audit.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Interactive Mini Network
Click any neighbor to re-center the graph and follow the threads of connection.
Knowledge Graph Neighbors
Auto-linked to the rest of the Human Behavior Taxonomy by family, domain, dimension, and shared keywords.
Productivity targets compress visits, raising misdiagnosis and burnout.
A federal mandate intended to lower drug costs for the poor became a profit engine for hospitals and contract pharmacies.
Liability exposure pushes clinicians to order tests for legal protection rather than clinical need.
Federal reimbursement rules incentivize cycling seniors through hospitalizations to upgrade billing categories.
Paying providers per procedure rewards more procedures, not better outcomes.
Systems paid per filled bed have weak incentives to invest in prevention or community health.
Opaque billing rules create lucrative work for administrators and revenue-cycle firms instead of care.
Insurers profit when claims are denied, delayed, or abandoned.
Hospital group-purchasing and opaque contracting inflate device costs far above marginal cost.
Sales bonuses and prescriber relationships fueled mass over-prescription and an addiction crisis.
Federal incentives meant for neglected diseases get used to privatize widely available medicines.
Drug companies optimize for high-margin chronic conditions, not cures.