Scientific Definition
Insurers profit when claims are denied, delayed, or abandoned.
Plain-English Definition
Insurers profit when claims are denied, delayed, or abandoned.
Feynman Explanation
The system is working exactly as designed. That's the problem.
Core Principle
Insurers profit when claims are denied, delayed, or abandoned.
Mechanisms
Pending editorial review.
Insurers profit when claims are denied, delayed, or abandoned.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Customer-hostile design is rational under the current incentives.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Inputs (Triggers)
Pending editorial review.
Outputs (Behaviors)
Pending editorial review.
Behavioral Signature
The system is working exactly as designed. That's the problem.
Examples
- Routine denials of first claims, knowing many won't be appealed.
- Customer-hostile design is rational under the current incentives.
Pending editorial review.
Famous Experiments
Pending editorial review.
Design Principles
- Regulatory simplicity. Auto-adjudication. Outcome-tied insurer incentives.
Measurement Approaches
Pending editorial review.
Evidence
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
The Perverse Incentive Lens™
How this behavior is exploited — and how to redesign around it.
- Regulatory simplicity. Auto-adjudication. Outcome-tied insurer incentives.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Interactive Mini Network
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Knowledge Graph Neighbors
Auto-linked to the rest of the Human Behavior Taxonomy by family, domain, dimension, and shared keywords.
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