Scientific Definition
Paying providers per procedure rewards more procedures, not better outcomes.
Plain-English Definition
Paying providers per procedure rewards more procedures, not better outcomes.
Feynman Explanation
A system that wanted sick people would design exactly the one we have.
Core Principle
Paying providers per procedure rewards more procedures, not better outcomes.
Mechanisms
Pending editorial review.
Paying providers per procedure rewards more procedures, not better outcomes.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
U.S. healthcare's $4.5T spend produces middle-of-the-pack outcomes.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Inputs (Triggers)
Pending editorial review.
Outputs (Behaviors)
Pending editorial review.
Behavioral Signature
A system that wanted sick people would design exactly the one we have.
Examples
- Hospitals reimbursed more when complications occur — paying for the response, not the prevention.
- U.S. healthcare's $4.5T spend produces middle-of-the-pack outcomes.
Pending editorial review.
Famous Experiments
Pending editorial review.
Design Principles
- Outcome-based contracts. Capitated payment. Bundled care.
Measurement Approaches
Pending editorial review.
Evidence
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
The Perverse Incentive Lens™
How this behavior is exploited — and how to redesign around it.
- Outcome-based contracts. Capitated payment. Bundled care.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Interactive Mini Network
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Knowledge Graph Neighbors
Auto-linked to the rest of the Human Behavior Taxonomy by family, domain, dimension, and shared keywords.
Productivity targets compress visits, raising misdiagnosis and burnout.
A federal mandate intended to lower drug costs for the poor became a profit engine for hospitals and contract pharmacies.
Liability exposure pushes clinicians to order tests for legal protection rather than clinical need.
Federal reimbursement rules incentivize cycling seniors through hospitalizations to upgrade billing categories.
Systems paid per filled bed have weak incentives to invest in prevention or community health.
Opaque billing rules create lucrative work for administrators and revenue-cycle firms instead of care.
Insurers profit when claims are denied, delayed, or abandoned.
Hospital group-purchasing and opaque contracting inflate device costs far above marginal cost.
Sales bonuses and prescriber relationships fueled mass over-prescription and an addiction crisis.
Federal incentives meant for neglected diseases get used to privatize widely available medicines.
Drug companies optimize for high-margin chronic conditions, not cures.
Specialists earn more for procedures than primary care for prevention.