Scientific Definition
Believing a specific scenario is more likely than its more general one.
Plain-English Definition
Believing a specific scenario is more likely than its more general one.
Feynman Explanation
'Linda is a feminist bank teller' feels more likely than just 'Linda is a bank teller.' It can't be.
Core Principle
Believing a specific scenario is more likely than its more general one.
Mechanisms
Believing a specific scenario is more likely than its more general one.
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Inputs (Triggers)
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Outputs (Behaviors)
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Behavioral Signature
'Linda is a feminist bank teller' feels more likely than just 'Linda is a bank teller.' It can't be.
Examples
- Strategies sold as detailed scenarios that are necessarily less likely than the general bet.
- Forecasts that gain credibility by gaining unnecessary detail.
Pending editorial review.
Famous Experiments
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Design Principles
- Decompose claims into base probabilities.
Measurement Approaches
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Evidence
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The Perverse Incentive Lens™
How this behavior is exploited — and how to redesign around it.
- Decompose claims into base probabilities.
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Interactive Mini Network
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Knowledge Graph Neighbors
Auto-linked to the rest of the Human Behavior Taxonomy by family, domain, dimension, and shared keywords.
Believing past random events influence future independent ones.
Believing streaks predict future streaks.
We underestimate time and cost; we overestimate benefit.
We prefer known risks to unknown ones, even when the unknown is better.
We ignore underlying probabilities in favor of vivid specifics.
Underestimating the probability of bad outcomes — especially to us.
Overestimating the probability of bad outcomes.
Worst-cases assumed as base-cases because they 'feel responsible.'
We prefer eliminating a small risk completely over reducing a larger one partially.
Systematic deviations from rationality in judgment.
Throwing more in because we already threw a lot in.
Generalizing from winners while ignoring identical losers.