Scientific Definition
A long-run planner self in conflict with a short-run impulsive self.
Plain-English Definition
A long-run planner self in conflict with a short-run impulsive self.
Feynman Explanation
The you that signs the gym contract vs. the you that has to go.
Core Principle
A long-run planner self in conflict with a short-run impulsive self.
Mechanisms
Pending editorial review.
A long-run planner self in conflict with a short-run impulsive self.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Compensation, savings, and OKR design are dual-self management problems.
Inputs (Triggers)
Pending editorial review.
Outputs (Behaviors)
Pending editorial review.
Behavioral Signature
The you that signs the gym contract vs. the you that has to go.
Examples
- Saving vs. spending; dieting vs. eating; pre-committing vs. defecting.
- Compensation, savings, and OKR design are dual-self management problems.
Pending editorial review.
Famous Experiments
Pending editorial review.
Design Principles
- Design defaults and commitments that bind the impulsive self in advance.
Measurement Approaches
Pending editorial review.
Evidence
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
The Perverse Incentive Lens™
How this behavior is exploited — and how to redesign around it.
- Design defaults and commitments that bind the impulsive self in advance.
Pending editorial review.
Pending editorial review.
Interactive Mini Network
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Knowledge Graph Neighbors
Auto-linked to the rest of the Human Behavior Taxonomy by family, domain, dimension, and shared keywords.
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Specialize in what you give up the least to do.
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Each additional unit produces less marginal benefit.
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Bad money drives out good when both are legally equivalent.
The mythical fully rational, self-interested, utility-maximizing agent neoclassical models assume.
One party has more or better information than another.